I was having an argument this weekend with a friend of mine who was trying to maintain that there was "no connection" between Hussein and Al Qaeda.  It caused me to go re-read many of Stephen Hayes' articles on the subject.  I don't know why the White House isn't doing this on their own.
Actually, I have an idea why they don't.  If they were to start making the case more strongly for this connection, inevitably something they say would be wrong which would bring a new round of catcalls and sniping that they are "lying."  Actually, nothing would even need to be wrong, just a piece of evidence showing the connection contradicted by another piece of evidence that says otherwise and out would come the long knives.
I think this judgment is misplaced.  Is it really possible for the left to accuse the administration of "lying" more than they already have?  They are going to make the accusations regardless, get the case out there.  Someone in the executive branch needs to get the evidence out there as quickly as possible.
Here is a sampling of Hayes' work on this subject that is worth reading if you haven't, and worth re-reading if you have. 
      From the 9-11 Commission:
     Bin Ladin also explored possible cooperation with Iraq during his time  in Sudan, despite his opposition to Hussein's secular regime. Bin Ladin had in  fact at one time sponsored anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan. The  Sudanese, to protect their own ties with Iraq, reportedly persuaded bin Ladin to  cease this support and arranged for contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda. A senior  Iraqi Intelligence officer reportedly made three visits to Sudan, finally  meeting bin Ladin in 1994.
 
 
     For those analysts and politicians, particularly in the United States,  who cling desperately to the notion that there was "no connection" between Iraq  and al Qaeda, Ansar al Islam presents a problem. Typical of this was an article  in the July 10, 2005, issue of Time magazine. Written by former Clinton  administration counterterrorism official Daniel Benjamin, the article  presumptuously declared "we know there was no pre-existing relationship between  Baghdad and al-Qaeda."
 The evidence, of course, suggests that this analysis is wrong. Even as  naysayers in the States continue to deny any connection, such staunchly  anti-Iraq War publications as Le Monde have long since conceded the point. One  day before the Time article, on July 9, the French daily published a news story  that declared Ansar al Islam "was founded in 2001 with the joint help of Saddam  Hussein--who intended to use it against moderate Kurds--and al Qaeda, which  hoped to find in Kurdistan a new location that would receive its  members."
 On this, at least, the French are right.
 Two intercepts in 2002--one in May, the other in October--illuminated the  Iraqi regime's role in Ansar al Islam. The first revealed that an Iraqi  Intelligence officer praised the work of the terrorist group and passed $100,000  to its leaders. The second, described in a report from the National Security  Agency, reported that the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda reached an agreement whereby  the regime would provide safehaven in northern Iraq to al Qaeda terrorists  fleeing Afghanistan. Also, the regime agreed to fund and to arm the incoming  jihadists.
  The Mother of All Connections: 
      This unclassified document was released by the Pentagon in late March 2005.  It details the case for designating an Iraqi member of al Qaeda, currently  detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as an "enemy combatant."
     1. From 1987 to 1989, the detainee served as an infantryman in the Iraqi  Army and received training on the mortar and rocket propelled grenades.
2. A  Taliban recruiter in Baghdad convinced the detainee to travel to Afghanistan to  join the Taliban in 1994.
3. The detainee admitted he was a member of the  Taliban.
4. The detainee pledged allegiance to the supreme leader of the  Taliban to help them take over all of Afghanistan.
5. The Taliban issued the  detainee a Kalishnikov rifle in November 2000.
6. The detainee worked in a  Taliban ammo and arms storage arsenal in Mazar-Es-Sharif organizing weapons and  ammunition.
7. The detainee willingly associated with al Qaida members. 
8. The detainee was a member of al Qaida.
9. An assistant to Usama Bin  Ladin paid the detainee on three separate occasions between 1995 and 1997. 
10. The detainee stayed at the al Farouq camp in Darwanta, Afghanistan,  where he received 1,000 Rupees to continue his travels.
11. From 1997 to  1998, the detainee acted as a trusted agent for Usama Bin Ladin, executing three  separate reconnaissance missions for the al Qaeda leader in Oman, Iraq, and  Afghanistan.
12. In August 1998, the detainee traveled to Pakistan with a  member of Iraqi Intelligence for the purpose of blowing up the Pakistan, United  States and British embassies with chemical mortars.
13. Detainee was  arrested by Pakistani authorities in Khudzar, Pakistan, in July  2002.
    Interesting. What's more interesting: The alleged plot was to have taken  place in August 1998, the same month that al Qaeda attacked two U.S. embassies  in East Africa. And more interesting still: It was to have taken place in the  same month that the Clinton administration publicly accused Iraq of supplying al  Qaeda with chemical weapons expertise and material.
 
   Saddam's Al Qaeda Connection: 
   Finally, what if any new evidence has emerged that bolsters the Bush  administration's prewar case? 
 The answer to that last question is simple: lots. The CIA has confirmed,  in interviews with detainees and informants it finds highly credible, that al  Qaeda's Number 2, Ayman al-Zawahiri, met with Iraqi intelligence in Baghdad in  1992 and 1998. More disturbing, according to an administration official familiar  with briefings the CIA has given President Bush, the Agency has "irrefutable  evidence" that the Iraqi regime paid Zawahiri $300,000 in 1998, around the time  his Islamic Jihad was merging with al Qaeda. "It's a lock," says this source.  Other administration officials are a bit more circumspect, noting that the  intelligence may have come from a single source. Still, four sources spread  across the national security hierarchy have confirmed the payment.  
  and 
   And there are reports of more direct links between the Iraqi regime and  bin Laden. Farouk Hijazi, former Iraqi ambassador to Turkey and Saddam's  longtime outreach agent to Islamic fundamentalists, has been captured. In his  initial interrogations, Hijazi admitted meeting with senior al Qaeda leaders at  Saddam's behest in 1994. According to administration officials familiar with his  questioning, he has subsequently admitted additional contacts, including a  meeting in late 1997. Hijazi continues to deny that he met with bin Laden on  December 21, 1998, to offer the al Qaeda leader safe haven in Iraq. U.S.  officials don't believe his denial. 
 For one thing, the meeting was reported in the press at the time. It also  fits a pattern of contacts surrounding Operation Desert Fox, the series of  missile strikes the Clinton administration launched at Iraq beginning December  16, 1998. The bombing ended 70 hours later, on December 19, 1998. Administration  officials now believe Hijazi left for Afghanistan as the bombing ended and met  with bin Laden two days later. 
 Earlier that year, at another point of increased tension between the  United States and Iraq, Hussein sought to step up contacts with al Qaeda. On  February 18, 1998, after the Iraqis repeatedly refused to permit U.N. weapons  inspectors into sensitive sites, President Bill Clinton went to the Pentagon and  delivered a hawkish speech about Hussein's weapons of mass destruction and his  links to "an unholy axis of terrorists, drug traffickers, and organized  international criminals." Said Clinton: "We have to defend our future from these  predators of the 21st century. . . . They will be all the more lethal if we  allow them to build arsenals of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and  the missiles to deliver them. We simply cannot allow that to happen. There is no  more clear example of this threat than Saddam Hussein." 
 The following day, February 19, 1998, according to documents unearthed in  Baghdad after the recent war by journalists Mitch Potter and Inigo Gilmore,  Hussein's intelligence service wrote a memo detailing upcoming meetings with a  bin Laden representative traveling to Baghdad. Each reference to bin Laden had  been covered with Liquid Paper. The memo laid out a plan to step up contacts  between Iraq and al Qaeda. The Mukhabarat, one of Saddam's security forces,  agreed to pay for "all the travel and hotel costs inside Iraq to gain the  knowledge of the message from bin Laden and to convey to his envoy an oral  message from us to bin Laden." The document set as the goal for the meeting a  discussion of "the future of our relationship with him, bin Laden, and to  achieve a direct meeting with him." The al Qaeda representative, the document  went on to suggest, might be "a way to maintain contacts with bin Laden."